Naturalistic Paganism

Can you be a modern Stoic and an atheist or agnostic?

Although most Stoics appear to have placed considerable importance upon belief in God (actually, Zeus), there is  some indication that others may have adopted a more agnostic stance, something relatively unusual for the period in which they lived.

This debate naturally interests modern Stoics, many of whom are agnostics or atheists themselves and seek to reconcile Stoic ethics and psychological practices with their own contemporary worldview.

Ancient agnostics

It’s worth noting, perhaps, that Socrates was sometimes seen as an agnostic (although at times he is also portrayed as extremely pious) and yet the Stoics appear generally to have held him up as an example of someone close to the embodiment of the ideal Sage.  His skepticism about proving the existence of God rationally, and openness to the possibility that God doesn’t exist, doesn’t appear to have prevented ancient Stoics from admiring him and aspiring to imitate him.

Moreover, according to Cicero, at least one influential Stoic explicitly discounted the importance of belief in God.  Panaetius, the last “scholarch” or head of the Athenian school of Stoicism, who introduced it to Rome, is reported to have stated that discussion of the gods is “nugatory” or pointless in relation to the Stoic way of life (q.v., Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, in The Cambridge Companion to The Stoics, 2003, p. 154).

Moreover, Aristo of Chios, an influential associate of Zeno, who leaned more toward Cynicism and rejected certain fundamental aspects of early Stoicism, held more sceptical views later reported by Cicero as follows:

“Aristo holds that no form of God is conceivable, and denies him sensation, and is in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether he is, or is not, animate” (On the Nature of the Gods, 1.14).

His views appear to have been controversial within Stoicism, although they also seem to have had a lasting influence.

Marcus Aurelius

About nine times in The Meditations, Marcus Aurelius alludes to contrasting viewpoints traditionally taken as characteristic of two opposing traditions in ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy: “God or atoms”.  Belief that God (or “Providence”) ordered the cosmos was taken to be characteristic of the broad tradition originating with Pythagoras and Socrates, and including Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.  By contrast, belief that the universe was due to the random collision of atoms, originating with Democritus, was characteristic of the Epicurean school, the main rival of Stoicism.  Some of Marcus’ comments are as follows:

Recall once again this alternative: ‘if not a wise Providence [God], then a mere jumble of atoms’… (iv.3)

Alexander of Macedon and his stable-boy were brought to the same state by death; for either they were received among the same creative principle of the universe [God], or they were alike dispersed into atoms. ( vi.24)

So Marcus argues that the Stoic’s attitude toward death should be the same whether he believes in God or not.

If the choice is yours, why do the thing?  If another’s, where are you to lay the blame for it?  On gods?  On atoms?  Either would be insanity.  All thoughts of blame are out of place. ( viii.17)

That is, whether a Stoic believes in God or not (in mere random atoms), either way he should not think in terms of “blame”.

It may be that the World-Mind [God] wills each separate happening in succession; and, if so, then accept the consequences.  Or, it may be, there was but one primal act of will, of which all else is the sequel; every event being thus the germ of another.  To put it another way, things are either isolated units [atoms], or they form one inseparable whole.  If that whole be God, then all is well; but if aimless chance, at least you need not be aimless also. (ix.28)

So the Stoic reminds himself that even if the whole universe is composed of aimless chance, or random atoms, rather than being steered by God, in any case, he should himself not act aimlessly.  In other words, we should make it our constant goal to pursue the good, to pursue wisdom and the other virtues, whether or not we believe in Providence.

Either things must have their origin in one single intelligent source [God], and all fall into place to compose, as it were, one single body – in which case no part ought to complain of what happens for the good of the whole – or else the world is nothing but atoms and their confused minglings and dispersions.  So why be so harassed? (ix.39)

Whether one’s fate is the product of an intelligent God or the mere random collision of atoms, in either case, the Stoic should not feel personally harassed.  (Because our only true good is virtue, which is under our own control, and external matters are morally indifferent.)

No matter whether the universe is a confusion of atoms or a natural growth, let my first conviction be that I am part of a Whole which is under Nature’s governance; and my second, that a bond of kinship exists between myself and all other similar parts. (x.6)

So the Stoic principle of kinship to all mankind, and to Nature as a whole, holds good, whether or not we believe in a provident God.  Likewise:

There must be either a predestined Necessity and inviolable plan, or a gracious Provident God, or a chaos without design or director.  If then there be an inevitable Necessity, why kick against the pricks?  If a Providence that is ready to be gracious, render thyself worthy of divine succour.  But if a chaos without guide, congratulate thyself that amid such a surging sea thou hast in thyself a guiding rational faculty [hêgemonikon].  (xii, 14)

And:

[Thou must have this rule ready for use:] to realize that all that befalls thee from without is due either to Chance or to Providence, nor hast thou any call to blame Chance or to impeach Providence. (xii, 24)

In summary, Marcus appears to be trying to persuade himself:

• That whether we are dissolved into God or dispersed among random atoms, either way all of us, whether kings or servants, face the fate in death.
• That whether the universe is rule by a provident God or due to the random collision of atoms, either way it makes no sense to blame others for our actions.
• Whether the universe is governed by God or due to the “aimless chance” movement of atoms, either way “you need not be aimless also.”
• Wether the universe is governed by a single intelligent Providence or it is nothing but random atoms, in either case on should not be “harassed”.
• Finally, whether the universe is a “confusion of atoms” or the natural growth (of a provident God?), either way I should be convinced that I am part of something bigger, and a kinship therefore exists between me and other parts.

Scholars disagree over Marcus’ intention in presenting himself with this dichotomous choice between “God and atoms”, however.  One common interpretation is that he is reminding himself that whether a creator God exists, or whether the universe is simply ordered by blind chance, in either case the practical (ethical) principles of Stoicism should still be followed.  For the Stoics, who were essentially pantheists, theology was part of the discipline of “physics”, because they were materialists, who viewed God as pervading, and ordering, the whole of nature.

Epictetus

Moreover, I believe that a remark made by Epictetus, whose philosophy Marcus studied closely may be read as shedding further light on the contrast between “God or atoms”.  In one of the fragments attributed to Epictetus (fr. 1) we are told he said the following:

What does it matter to me, says Epictetus, whether the universe is composed of atoms or uncompounded substances, or of fire and earth?  Is it not sufficient to know the true nature of good and evil, and the proper bounds of our desires and aversions, and also of our impulses to act and not to act; and by making use of these as rules to order the affairs of our life, to bid those things that are beyond us farewell?  It may very well be that these latter things are not to be comprehended by the human mind, and even if one assumes that they are perfectly comprehensible, well what profit comes from comprehending them?  And ought we not to say that those men trouble in vain who assign all this as necessary to the philosopher’s system of thought? […] What Nature is, and how she administers the universe, and whether she really exists or not, these are questions about which there is no need to go on to bother ourselves.

It’s not clear how we’re to interpret this passage, and it may perhaps not be authentic.  However, if it comes from one of the two lost books of the Discourses, this may be the source of Marcus Aurelius’ comments about “God and atoms”.

What is clear is that in this passage, Epictetus says that questions concerning Nature (Phusis),  which the Stoics use as a synonym for God, are unnecessary and potentially distracting elements of philosophy.  He even says that whether Nature (God?) really exists or not, is a question about which there is no need for Stoics to bother themselves.

He also says that specific questions such as whether the universe is made of atoms or of elements such as “fire and earth”, are fundamentally indifferent with regard to Stoic ethics.  The Stoics believed that the universe is composed of a divine fire-like substance with causal powers (aka “pneuma”), identified both with God and the “spark” or fragment of divinity within humans, and the inert earth or matter upon which it acts.

Epictetus goes on to say that the elements of nature “perhaps are incomprehensible to the human mind, but even if one should suppose them to be wholly comprehensible, still, what good does it do to comprehend them?”  As the Stoic thought God to be material, this might be read as a kind of agnosticism, which questions whether knowledge of God is comprehensible or necessary to the practical aims of Stoic philosophy.

Toward agnostic Stoicism?

Overall, I would say that the literature of ancient Stoicism suggests that Marcus Aurelius and perhaps also Epictetus believed that agnosticism or even atheism may have been consistent with the Stoic way of life.

What I haven’t attempted to do here is to argue at length for the philosophical consistency of an agnostic (or atheistic) form of Stoicism.  However, in this regard, I would begin by pointing to the argument that the central principle of Stoicism, that the only true good is wisdom (the cardinal human virtue or excellence), acceptance of which arguably does not require belief in God, and from which other Stoic principles may derive without the need for belief in God as an additional premise.

The author

Donald Robertson is a psychotherapist, specialising in cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), and the treatment of anxiety.

His background is in academic philosophy and he has a special interest in the relationship between ancient philosophy, especially Stoicism, and modern psychotherapy. He is the author of dozens of journal articles and several books on philosophy and psychotherapy:

● Build your Resilience (2012)
● The Practice of Cognitive-Behavioural Hypnotherapy (2012)
● The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (2010)
● The Discovery of Hypnosis: The Complete Writings of James Braid, The Father of Hypnotherapy (2009)

Donald’s Website:
www.londoncognitive.com